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I won't reiterate the evidence against TEW, since it has already been presented clearly by Travis Norsen, Eric Dennis and many others. In my judgment, violations of the Bell inequalities in "double-delayed-choice" (DDC) experiments have proven the existence of "non-local" interactions. TEW is a local theory, and therefore it contradicts the results of these experiments. Furthermore, locality is fundamental to Little's theory—to renounce locality is to reject TEW. (Of course, it is still possible that some features of TEW may survive in a different theory.) The scientific argument for non-local interactions consists of two major elements: the derivation of the Bell inequalities and the results of DDC experiments. Although the advocates of TEW have had ample time, they have not responded to this argument. Instead, they merely deny the conclusion—without identifying any logical flaw or mistaken premise. There is a point at which it becomes arbitrary to simply claim the existence of some unspecified error. Some supporters of TEW are unwilling to accept the scientific evidence because they regard locality as a philosophic issue. They claim that non-locality is equivalent to magical action-at-a-distance, i.e., entities acting where they are not, by no physical means. According to this view, locality is a corollary of causality. The experimental evidence for non-local interactions then precipitates a crisis: they must choose between the law of causality and the observed facts. The way out of this dilemma is to recognize that non-locality poses no threat to causality. As a principle of metaphysics, causality states a universal truth graspable by any man in any era, independent of the prevailing state of scientific knowledge. Philosophy says nothing about the nature of the physical stuff that fills the universe (except that it exists and has a nature). Interactions between physical entities may propagate faster than light; on this issue, the law of causality is silent. Furthermore, if an action at location A causes a change at location B, metaphysics alone does not tell us that there was a time delay while something moved from A to B. It is not the function of metaphysics to answer questions such as: when one sits on a teeter-totter, does the other end simultaneously rise? [1] The axioms of metaphysics serve the purpose of delimiting our thought to the realm of reality. They do not allow us to deduce the nature of reality. To attempt such deduction is to follow the method of Rene Descartes, not that of Ayn Rand. It was Einstein's theory of relativity that led many physicists to suppose that all interactions must be local. However, Einstein's theory is merely a mathematical formalism, devoid of physical explanation. An empty formalism does not provide the basis for such a universal generalization. We all want to see the return of rational physics, and the end of
today's pseudo-physics that swings wildly between mystical fantasy and
"describe-the-appearances" skepticism. To achieve this goal, I think
we must fight for Objectivism as the philosophic foundation of
physics. The first step, however, is to thoroughly understand the
ideas we are fighting for. Our efforts will result only in
self-destruction if we transform Ayn Rand's philosophy into
rationalist dogma—and then find ourselves opposing the observed facts.
Copyright 2001 David Harriman. All rights reserved. letter to the editor student resource
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